Archiv der Kategorie 'Türkische Haus'

U.S. Officials Are Worried About Turkish Foray Into Syria

A major incursion could prompt Trump administration to withdraw troops, essentially ending fight against Islamic State in Syria

U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that Turkey soon will mount a major incursion into northern Syria and trigger a clash with Kurdish fighters, a move likely to prompt the Trump administration to withdraw all U.S. forces from Syria to avoid a conflict.

A U.S. pullout would essentially end the fight against Islamic State in Syria, which U.S. officials still consider a viable terrorist network capable of staging attacks against the U.S. and its allies and interests despite having lost its so-called caliphate.

Turkey wants to resettle up to two million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey in Syrian border towns that would be cleared of Kurdish forces known as the YPG, a group Turkey considers to be a terrorist affiliate of the Turkey-based PKK.

But while Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, views the Kurdish military organization as a terrorist group, U.S. officials credit Kurdish fighters with eliminating Islamic State’s territorial hold in Syria.

Washington has attempted to quell Turkish concerns by conducting joint military patrols in two Syrian cities and holding talks on Turkey’s request for a 300-mile safe zone along the border between the two countries.

Now, U.S. officials said this week that they see mounting evidence that Turkey is preparing to insert forces into northeastern Syria in the coming days or weeks, putting U.S. forces at potential risk.

“It’s a perfect storm, it’s really ugly. There may just be no choice but to leave,” one U.S. official said.

In Ankara, government officials said they were frustrated by the slow pace of joint efforts to create what they call safe areas for refugees in northeastern Syria. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper spoke about the issue with his Turkish counterpart, Defense Minister Hulusi Akar on Thursday.

The U.S. hasn’t formally warned Turkey about a possible withdrawal from Syria, one person familiar with the matter said. If the U.S. conveyed such a message, the person said, it would be interpreted as “a perception ploy,” a way to tell the Turks that they could be worse off dealing alone with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and its main backer, Russia.

Turkish officials didn’t respond to questions about their military plans. On Tuesday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey told parliament’s opening session that his country had no choice but to act unilaterally to create a safe zone in northern Syria.

“We have not achieved any of the results we desired,” Mr. Erdogan said. “Turkey cannot lose even a single day on this issue. There is no other choice but to act on our own.”

YPG representatives declined to comment, and a spokesperson for the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition led by Kurdish fighters, didn’t respond to requests for comment.

U.S. attempts over the past year to elicit European interest in the Syrian refugee resettlement plan have fallen short, and talks between Washington and Ankara have dragged on.

Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu of Turkey said the U.S. wasn’t sincere about cooperating in northeastern Syria. “We think the process under way with the U.S. won’t take us to the point we want. Information coming from the field proves it,” the minister told Turkish television Wednesday.

Turkey could choose to insert a small number of forces, potentially drawing a muted Kurdish reaction. But if Turkey conducts a widespread incursion using heavy arms and forces, the U.S. might have no choice but to pull its more than 1,000 troops out of Syria to avoid a potential conflict with a NATO ally, officials said. The U.S. had more than 2,000 troops in Syria last year.

U.S. officials said they harbor deep misgivings about withdrawing troops from the area and leaving their close Kurdish allies to an uncertain fate, a move that would send a conflicting message about U.S. reliability to other current and prospective U.S. partners world-wide.

But President Trump, who now is facing an impeachment inquiry and is eager to demonstrate a foreign policy victory, has tried to disengage the U.S. from conflicts overseas, including in Syria. Last year, he called for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Syria, but ultimately reversed himself after a backlash by GOP allies and top military officials.

The problems associated with pulling U.S. support from Kurdish allies were among arguments against a full U.S. withdrawal last year. However, military officials said they have grown resigned to the situation, adding that an armed clash between Turkey and Kurdish forces would heighten prospects of a pullout.

The complex issues surrounding the U.S. presence in Syria will fall squarely on the Pentagon’s new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Mark Milley, who succeeded Marine Gen. Joe Dunford. Gen. Dunford served as the administration’s primary military contact with Ankara.

In calls and visits with Turkish leaders, Gen. Dunford, who stepped down Monday, repeatedly urged Turkey to exercise restraint, defense officials said. Gen. Dunford last spoke to his Turkish counterpart two weeks ago, according to Joint Staff officials.

U.S. officials have grown alarmed about Ankara’s moves in part because they worry Turkey won’t provide an adequate notice that it is moving in, one official said. Any warning could come less than 48 hours before Turkey takes action.“It seems more and more likely based on the actions they are taking in southern Turkey,” said one U.S. official, referring to movements of equipment and personnel.

Turkey has long complained about the buildup of Kurdish forces and influence along its southern border, calling it a direct threat. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey has entered Syria twice in a bid to stop Kurdish expansion.

In response, U.S. officials had set up joint U.S.-Turkish patrols to cool tensions. Last year, in the Syrian city of Manbij, U.S. and Turkish forces conducted joint patrols after Turkey threatened to launch an offensive against Kurds based at the border. Since September, U.S. and Turkish forces have conducted joint patrols in the Syrian city of Tal Abayd.

“The U.S.’s current position in northeast Syria is not tenable over the long term,” said Jennifer Cafarella, a Syria analyst at the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War. “The U.S. does not have enough forces in Syria to prevent the Turks from crossing the border and will not fight Turkey, a NATO ally, if that occurs.”

The Wall Street Journal

Turkey Supports Isis and Al Qaeda in Syria

Turkey Supports Isis and Al Qaeda in Syria / Ahmet Yayla ( follower of Fetullah Gülen )

REPORT: The ISIS oil business and Turkey, Turkey-ISIS Research Project (2019)

Turkey’s approach and policies towards the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as the Islamic State and sometimes referred to as ISIL, IS and Daesh), one of history’s most dreaded and violent terrorist groups, have been under the spotlight. The Turkish government has been accused time and again of conniving, covertly providing financial and/or military support or at least tolerating ISIS. Official statements, documents, witness testimonies, relevant research and reporting from the field by well-regarded institutions and media organs laid bare the naked truth that without the Turkey of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the clientele for ISIS oil would be limited and hence the revenue it generated to fuel the conflict would have been less.

The most damning revelations of the Erdoğan government and the ISIS oil business came from Russia, which is now working with Turkey in neutralizing the jihadist threat in Syria’s north. After a Russian warplane was shot down on the Turkish-Syrian border by a Turkish F-16 on November 24, 2015, Moscow broadcast these claims at the highest pitch possible. Russian President Vladimir Putin directly accused Turkey, particularly Turkish President Erdoğan and his family, of having commercial ties with ISIS and helping sell its oil.

This allegation was not new nor was it an empty one. The Erdoğan regime’s leniency towards ISIS, especially in the form of loose border controls for the passage of jihadists to join ISIS from around the world, was already generating huge criticism. Russian claims that the Turkish Islamist autocrat was aiding and abetting ISIS terrorism by facilitating the oil trade through a network of cronies, involving in particular some family members, were new. And they were very serious. As expected, these assertions stirred significant reaction and sparked a flow of information from the field that provided more details concerning ISIS’s oil business.

One cannot help but wonder if the Russian claim that Erdoğan was the number-one protector of ISIS was ever grounded in fact or even cogent in the first place. If so, why Russia has simply abandoned its tantrums and started pretending that Turkey had always been the flag bearer of the great battle against terrorism. Then what was Vladimir Putin’s motive when he all of a sudden began lambasting Turkey and its ruling elite? How come the two states, which were at each other’s throat, started watching each other’s back against the US? Perhaps all these seemingly cozy ties between Putin and Erdoğan were nothing but a facade that benefited both for tactical purposes in the short run, when both leaders in fact harbor a deep mistrust of each other.

Turkey’s shifting of its historic axis from its traditional transatlantic allies to the authoritarian Eurasia worked for Erdoğan, who wants to rule his 80-million-strong nation with the iron grip of an authoritarian even if that means going against Turkey’s national security requirements, which need Western backing against the Russian bear. For Putin, Erdoğan’s Turkey gave him leverage to bargain with the US in the face of the expanding NATO alliance, applying economic and financial pressure. In any case, Erdoğan’s brief challenge of Russia let out the open secret of how Turkey allowed the ISIS oil business to thrive.

PROVOKING A BEAR

The downing of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M jet by a Turkish F-16 marked a distinct turning point that would leave a huge impact on not only the course of Russo-Turkish relations but also the multi-faceted, violent standoff in Syria. After their jet was shot down and the pilot was murdered, Russia was in a towering rage. Without spending much time on the details of the clash at the border, the Russian side all of a sudden launched a series of accusations of Turkey’s aiding and abetting of ISIS terrorists and actively engaging in and facilitating their oil trade.

Putin said, “We have every reason to think that the decision to shoot down our plane was dictated by the desire to protect the oil supply lines to Turkish territory.” He continued his harsh remarks, clearly identifying Turkey as ISIS’s henchman: “This incident stands out against the usual fight against terrorism. Our troops are fighting heroically against terrorists, risking their lives. But the loss we suffered today came from a stab in the back delivered by accomplices of the terrorists.”

The Russian leader went on to say: “IS has big money, hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, from selling oil. In addition they are protected by the military of an entire nation. One can understand why they are acting so boldly and blatantly. Why they kill people in such atrocious ways. Why they commit terrorist acts across the world, including in the heart of Europe.” He promised that his government would not take the incident lightly: “We have always treated Turkey as not only a close neighbor, but also as a friendly nation. I don’t know who has an interest in what happened today, but we certainly don’t.”

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev jumped on the bandwagon after his leader and said: “Turkey’s actions are de facto protection of the Islamic State. … This is no surprise, considering the information we have about the direct financial interest of some Turkish officials relating to the supply of oil products refined by plants controlled by ISIS.”

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov took the allegations a step further and pointed at Turkey as he was addressing the press in Moscow. “According to the information we’ve received, the senior political leadership of the country — President Erdoğan and his family — are involved in this criminal business. Maybe I’m being too blunt, but one can only entrust control over this thieving business to one’s closest associates. In the West, no one has asked questions about the fact that the Turkish president’s son heads one of the biggest energy companies, or that his son-in-law has been appointed energy minister. What a marvelous family business!” The high-ranking politician said Russia had evidence to prove that Erdoğan and his family personally benefitted from the oil trade with ISIS.

http://www.turkey-isis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Anatoly-Antonov.jpg
Then Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov (second from right) during press briefing on Erdoğan government’s role in financing ISIS. December 3, 2015

Antonov said oil in industrial quantities was continuously transported along “rolling pipelines,” referring to the kilometers-long queues of tanker trucks. “The cynicism of the Turkish leadership knows no limits. Look what they’re doing. They went into someone else’s country, they are robbing it without compunction,” he said.

Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoy as well as Director of the National Defense Management Center Gen. Mikhail Mezentse attended the same press conference. Rudskoy detailed how this “stolen oil” was transported into Turkey. According to the information he offered, there were basically three ways, the first of which led to the Batman oil refinery in the east; the second to the seaport city of İskenderun through Aleppo; and the third to the Zakho region in northern Iraq. Every day 8,000 tankers and 2,000 barrels entered Turkey for delivery to a military-controlled area in Silopi.

Gen. Rudskoy didn’t mince words when he mentioned that a company belonging to Erdoğan’s son was directly involved in this shady and dirty business. “According to our reliable intelligence data, Turkey has been carrying out such operations for a long period and on a regular basis. And most importantly, it does not plan to stop them,” he said.

MIXED SIGNALS FROM THE US

In the face of the Russian allegations, the US sent mixed signals on the ties between the ISIS oil trade and Turkey. While defending the Erdoğan government in a spirit of solidarity against the barrage of accusations leveled by Russia, US officials did not deny that some of the ISIS oil flowed to Turkey. They simply kept quiet on how such ISIS oil could go to Turkey without a permissive political environment.

“We frankly see no evidence, none, to support such an accusation,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner said on the Russian claims, adding that the only information they had concerning the issue was that ISIS was selling oil at the wellheads to middlemen, who were smuggling some of this oil into Turkey. He said that “there is no Turkish government complicity in some operation to buy illegal oil from the Islamic State. We just don’t believe that to be true in any way, shape or form.” US President Barack Obama also stood by Erdoğan, saying although ISIS recruits were still able to cross the Turkish border and that the terrorist group was still selling its oil through gaps in that border, Turkey’s progress in sealing its border with Syria must also be noted. Col. Steve Warren, the coalition spokesman in Baghdad, would agree, saying, “the Turks have been great partners” in fighting the Islamic State militants.

“The amount of oil being smuggled is extremely low and has decreased over time and is of no significance from a volume perspective — both volume of oil and volume of revenue,” said Amos Hochstein, US special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs.

A detailed account from the US side came from Adam Szubin, acting under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence with the Treasury. Speaking to an audience during a public event at Chatham House, he claimed that ISIS had reaped the hefty amount of $500 million from oil sales to the Syrian government as well as to Turkey. He stated an estimated monthly figure of $40 million pouring into ISIS’s coffers through the oil trade. Szubin was well aware that his claim was mind-boggling as he said both the Syrian regime and ISIS “are trying to slaughter each other, and they are still engaged in millions and millions of dollars of trade.”

There is a clear indication of this finding, the calculated possible revenue from the oil trade. If the actual number is really as low as $40 million a month, which means that Turkey’s share would be even less, the real motive for Erdoğan is not the benefit that would accrue from the trade but rather to allow jihadists to sustain their campaign through the income they generated from the smuggling of oil to Turkey by means of brokers. Szubin was probably hoping to make this point clear when he said: “It’s not just a financial issue — it is about foreign terrorist flows, it’s about weapons and it’s about financing. I think securing that border would pay major dividends in terms of intensifying the pressure and also reducing the threat.” The US official underlined that closing the Turkish border to flows was a key component and called on the Turks “to do more in that respect.”

Szubin asserted that the Syrian government had a “far greater” share in ISIS’s oil sales, while ISIS was using a lesser amount of oil for its own needs. The Kurds were ISIS’s third best customer when the two were not butchering each other, according to him, and only the remainder was going to Turkey. “Our sense is that ISIS is taking its profits basically at the wellhead and so while you do have ISIS oil ending up in a variety of different places, that’s not really the pressure we want when it comes to stemming the flow of funding — it really comes down to taking down their infrastructure,” he said.

The Russian Defense Ministry on its Facebook page issued a statement on December 5, 2015 challenging the US denial of images of trucks crossing the Turkish border. The statement said, “If the American colleagues are not satisfied with those ones, they should watch videos gained by their own UAVs.” The Defense Ministry’s tone was sarcastic. The words of the American officials “concerning impossibility to register the delivery of terrorists’ illegal oil products, are not just a ruse. It ‘smells’ as a real patronage,” the statement read.

“The irony of the Russians raising this concern is that there’s plenty of evidence to indicate that the largest consumer of ISIS oil is actually Bashar al-Assad and his regime, a regime that only remains in place because it is being propped up by the Russians,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said.

An interesting point that requires attention was that US Vice President Joe Biden had leveled similar accusations against Turkey a couple of months before the jet incident. He said in a speech at the Harvard Kennedy School on October 2, 2014 that Turkey and the United Arab Emirates were supporting extremist factions in Syria. “They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad. Except that the people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaeda and the extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.” But he would soon dial back these words after facing harsh reactions from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. His spokeswoman, Kendra Barkoff, said, “The Vice President apologized for any implication that Turkey or other allies and partners in the region had intentionally supplied or facilitated the growth of ISIS or other violent extremists in Syria.”

In addition to the US, several other voices were raised in support of Erdoğan. Presenting the reaction from Europe, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Vice-President Federica Mogherini on behalf of the European Commission said she knew of no evidence to support allegations that Turkey was benefiting financially from trading and smuggling ISIS oil.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also refuted the Russian allegations. Şerko Cevdet, head of the KRG energy commission, was quoted by the Turkish state-owned Anadolu news agency as saying: “The KRG exports its oil via pipelines and tankers to Turkey for sale to buyers around the world. The Russian satellite images showed these tankers.” Nobody really heeded the KRG’s denial as it was already one of the sides targeted by the accusations.

CROSSFIRE

Turkey’s eastern and southern neighbors also voiced their own criticism of the Erdoğan government and accused Turkey of helping ISIS’s oil smuggling business. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on December 7 said most of the oil that ISIS was stealing from Iraq and Syria was being smuggled and sold via Turkey.

Iran’s Secretary of the Expediency Council Mohsen Rezayee said: “Iranian military advisors in Syria have taken photos and filmed all the routes used by ISIS’s oil tankers to Turkey; these documents can be published. If the Turkish government is not aware of ISIS’s oil sales in their country, we can provide it with such intelligence.”

A similar, even harsher, denunciation came from Syrian Information Minister Omran al-Zoubi, who told RIA Novosti that President Erdoğan had personally ordered the shooting down of the Russian jet in reprisal for Russian airstrikes on ISIS’s oil production facilities in order to cripple the shady trade that was managed by his son, Bilal Erdoğan.

The three above-mentioned people were from states that had long aligned themselves with Russia, exactly the opposite of Turkey and the US in almost all regional and global major political disputes. So their reactions are understandable. US-ally Israel, on the other hand, deviated from the US rhetoric, possibly due to the deep-rooted enmity and distrust of Turkey. In January 2016 Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon claimed ISIS had “enjoyed Turkish money for oil for a very, very long period of time.” Israel itself faced the same accusations by the Arab media, though.

Czech President Milos Zeman harshly lambasted Turkey as a de facto ally of ISIS, too, when responding to a question concerning Turkey’s attacks on Kurdish forces in Syria. This was in March 2019, at a time when even Russia, the original instigator of the claim, is now Turkey’s best friend. Zeman said Turkey’s aid for ISIS basically took the form of selling its oil and providing logistical support when the group still held large swathes of land.

REPORTING FROM THE FIELD

Not long after the official Russian discourse about the Turkey-ISIS connections had crystallized, the Russian media started churning out stories to support the claims asserted by the top echelons of the Russian state. A half-hour documentary shot in the newly liberated Syrian town of Al-Shadadi in the Al-Hasakah Governorate by Russia Today (RT) was one such work. Titled “In the Name of the Profit,” the documentary mainly featured interviews with a number of fighters from the US-backed Kurdish militias battling ISIS as well as with captive ISIS terrorists. RT presented the documentary with these words: “Besides collecting irrefutable proof of quite cozy relations between ISIS and Turkey, RT managed [to] capture the mood of the populace who have lived and worked under ISIS yoke for months.”

Al-Shadadi is important since it is located in one of the most prolific areas of oil production in Syria. The documentary’s main effort seems to be to substantiate links between ISIS and the Turkish government. It was important in the sense that the Kurdish forces were in the company of the US, which provided unwavering backing to Turkey against the Russian allegations. Yet they were more than eager to offer evidence for the claims that Turkey was actually helping ISIS through facilitating its oil trade, paving the way for militant infiltrations or providing arms.

That said, the documentary actually displayed some seemingly convincing documents. Among the evidence found by the RT journalists in the liberated town were the passports of slain ISIS terrorists who had flocked to Syria from various parts of the world. All the passports seized by People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters who ousted ISIS forces from the town have Turkish border stamps on them. For instance, a passport ostensibly belonging to a Kazakh youth shows an entry stamp at Sabiha Gökçen Airport on September 2012 and a departure stamp from the Habur border gate with Iraq four days later, with a return to Turkey through Habur after five months. Half a dozen such passports shown in the documentary have Turkish border stamps on them with dates ranging from late 2012 to early 2013.

A captured ISIS militant named Mahmut from the Turkish province of Adıyaman interviewed in the documentary claimed that Turkey was allowing the passage of militants to backhandedly create a force against their sworn enemy, the Kurds, who were also the enemies of ISIS. “Turkey says I don’t put my hand directly on this, but I can get rid of my nemesis with the hand of someone else,” Mahmut claimed. Asked which groups Turkey supported against the Kurds, the captured terrorist mentions Jabhat an-Nusra and Ahrar as-Sham along with ISIS. The same person also claimed Turkish support for these groups originated from its desire to influence oil production and trade in the region. It must be underlined that those were the personal opinions of the person rather than facts.

Further evidence discovered by the Kurdish forces and shared with RT is a pile of invoices detailing the oil trade with the smugglers, such as the date, information on the truck drivers, the amount of oil in the barrels sold to middlemen, the price and total revenue, etc. Again, these documents must be treated with care since they prove the existence of oil shipments by truck rather than the direct involvement of the Turkish government.

A boy, seemingly no more than 13 years old called Malek, tells RT that he has been working at a makeshift refinery in his village ever since the occupation of their town. Speaking with a maturity far beyond his years, the boy said ISIS’s main motive was to get weapons from Turkey in return for oil. “They … go with the oil and come back with the guns. And so they go, back and forth, back and forth,” he said.

Some additional witnesses both from among the locals of the town and the captured terrorists also repeatedly underline the same thing: ISIS terrorists from Raqqa and Aleppo were coming to the town to collect oil and were telling the locals that the final delivery destination was Turkey.

An ISIS terrorist who identifies himself as Muhammed Ahmad Muhammed from Saudi Arabia says he used the Turkish route to join ISIS and that crossing the border was as easy as walking along a broad avenue. Another man claims the border was virtually nonexistent as ISIS had practically erased it.

A mere documentary broadcast by a Russian media outlet that has the notoriety of a propaganda tool is naturally not perfectly convincing and plausible proof of Turkey’s collusion with the most horrific terrorist organization of the recent past. However, it must be noted that the passports with stamps by Turkish border control officers substantiated the widely expressed claim that Turkey was intentionally overlooking the accumulation of extremists in Syria joining the ranks of ISIS.

ISIS’S TURKEY AMBASSADOR

A more recent and more serious account came from Abu Mansour al Maghrebi, who was interviewed by the nonprofit media outlet Homeland Security Today in March 2019. This interview, originally a very long piece, deserves particular attention.

http://www.turkey-isis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/abu-Mansour-1024x624.png
Abu Mansour al Maghrebi

“My issue [duties] was our [Islamic State’s] relationship with Turkish intelligence. Actually, this started when I was working at the borders,” he said. His job was to handle the flow of foreign fighters from around the world via Turkey to join ISIS.

He later became an ISIS diplomat to conduct negotiations with the Turkish side. “There were some agreements and understandings between Turkish intelligence and ISIS emni [ISIS’s internal security organization] about the border gates, for the people who got injured,” Abu Mansour noted. “I had direct meeting with MIT the [Turkish National Intelligence Organization], many meetings with them.”

Asked who exactly in the Turkish government was meeting ISIS members, he said it would change depending on the subject matter of the deliberations but again counted representatives of the Turkish intelligence agency and the military as regular attendees at the meetings. “I passed the borders and they let me pass. [At the border] the Turks always sent me a car and I’m protected. A team of two to three people from our side were with me. I was in charge of our team most of the time.” Turkey’s benefit in maintaining contact with ISIS, for Abu Mansour, was to control its borders, especially with northern Syria, where Kurds were gaining a foothold that might evolve into a state. A Kurdish state is perceived as an existential threat by Turkey, and since the Syrian Kurds are mostly affiliated with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), their rising importance naturally alarmed Turkey so much so that it even normalized having contacts with ISIS. Besides, Turkey was also committed to reviving its influence and power in the regions that were once part of the Ottoman Empire. The New Ottomanism is indeed a living ideology of Erdoğan and his government.

As to the allegations that Turkey was providing weapons to ISIS, he dismissed them out of hand, saying ISIS was indeed meeting most of its arms needs from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which Turkey publicly supports in their fight against the al-Assad administration. These soldiers of the FSA would exchange their equipment even for a pack of cigarettes, said the ISIS member. They were also able to get guns and explosives from a variety of sources such as the mafias, the anti-Assad groups, and the like.

An extensive report titled “Taking Stock: The Arming of Islamic State” by Amnesty International reached conclusions corroborating Abu Mansour. The report stated that “a substantial proportion of IS’ current military arsenal comprises weapons and equipment looted, captured or illicitly traded from poorly secured Iraqi military stocks.” This said, however, the terrorist organization was also able to capture or buy Syrian military stocks as well as arms supplied to opposition groups in Syria by Turkey, the Gulf States and the US.

He confirmed the rumors that the Turkish state was allowing the passage of injured ISIS members to receive treatment, saying that actually there was not even any passport control at the gates and that the public hospitals were treating the wounded fighters free of charge. “When the person gets injured, there is hospital in Syria, and this hospital sends him in a car to the border. There were ambulances on the Turkish side waiting for this person. There were doctors who disliked Bashar. They treated our guys. The MIT [Turkish intel bureau] was made aware of every critical situation and they sent the ambulances to the border. There were also hospitals close to the border. Those who received critical care were treated there and they [the MIT] sent the others all over Turkey depending on their needs. There were very interested doctors, Syrian and Turkish, who wanted to help. So, if there were not facilities to serve them on the border, they would be sent further into Turkey for this.”

Regarding the sale of ISIS oil, Abu Mansour said they sent most of the oil to Turkey while also selling a much smaller amount to the al-Assad regime. Abu Mansour said no negotiations were needed on this issue with Turkish government officials as “this happened spontaneously.” His statement confirmed the other accounts thatput the blame on middlemen: “Oil that went to the Syrian government – some went by pipes, some by trucks. Oil sent by Dawlah [ISIS] to Turkey was arranged by traders from Turkey who came to take the oil with our permissions. Traders came from the Syrian side also.”

CONFESSIONS

Journalist Fehim Taştekin of the Radikal newspaper on September 13, 2013 published some photos of kilometers-long makeshift pipelines illegally pumping fuel from Syria to Turkey for as low as TL 1.25 per liter. This had gone on for three years without any reaction or interruption from state officials or security forces, he wrote. Lee Oughton, a longtime Iraq security expert and former global manager for executive protection at oil field service giant Halliburton, observed that ISIS oil was trafficked up through Iraq and into Turkey to be refined there and then delivered for Turkish domestic consumption or export.

Piotr Zalewski from Bloomberg wrote Turkish middlemen were actively engaging with ISIS in the oil trade, citing Turkish deputy from the main opposition party Mehmet AliEdiboğlu, who thought the main motive for such people to take the risk of doing business with the murderers was the prospect of making lucrative profits from the high market prices for fuel in the local Turkish market. Turks pay about 5 lira per liter of fuel, while it was possible to get it from ISIS for half this amount, all costs included. In other words, the local traders would be able to make up to 80 percent in profits in a short period of time, an attractive enough deal to ignore even the most serious dangers.

http://www.turkey-isis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ISIS-Oil-trucks.jpg

Either in defense of Turkey or in accusation, almost all statements mention middlemen. Abu Muhammed from al-Mayadeen in eastern Syria was one of these middlemen. After joining ISIS in 2014, he was later entrusted with the position of payroll clerk. “I used to get a bag full of US dollars each month, millions of dollars,” Abu Muhammed said. Oil was being carried in containers called “hoot,” which means “whale” in Arabic, due to their size. Abu Muhammed said Turkey was not only buying oil from ISIS but was also turning a blind eye to ISIS selling oil to others and even facilitated ISIS oil exports. “We never faced any problems from the Turkish gendarmerie… They actually always seemed fully cooperative with us,” he was quoted as saying.

In a recent study by the Rojava Center for Strategic Studies (NRLS), captured ISIS members all verified the existence of an active line of trade of oil, food, medicine and agricultural products. Oil was flowing to Turkey through the Al-Rai, Jarablus and Idlib regions, according to their statements.

Most of these terrorists were held captive in the prisons controlled by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey designates as a terrorist organization and on which the US relied as the major land force to fight ISIS. İlyas Aydın (Abu Ubaidah al-Turkee), Savaş Yıldız (Abu Jihad al-Turkee), Abdul Aziz Munsi al-Anizi (Abu Omar al-Muhajir), Abu Mohammed al-Tunisi, Abu Sufyan al-Shamari and Alexanda Koteye, quoted in the study, all admitted the existence of strong commercial ties between ISIS and Turkey. The same İlyas Aydın spoke to BBC Turkish in August 2019. “There were so many oil engineers who had joined ISIS. The trade was mostly carried out by Syrian traders. Count just how many thousands of drivers were actively doing this job with their trucks, and you can understand how this wheel was spinning. They don’t have any ideology. But we held the wells. And it [the business] was earning us billions of dollars,” he was quoted as saying.

Although the particular emphasis of this work concerns the oil trade, let me parenthetically insert here the claims of the alleged trade of historic artifacts by the ISIS terrorists mentioned in the study. Abu Wafa al-Tunisi, İllyas Aydın, Abu Kasim, Hajji Mustafa al-Nahar, Abu Shiba al-Iraqi and Abu Turab al-Sahrawi all confessed to the smuggling of antiquities stolen from archaeological sites in Iraq and Syria. They said ISIS would sell them through brokers in Turkey and that the videos of the bombing of such sites were only exploited as fake propaganda.

Another confession came from ISIS official Sadam al-Gamal. In a televised interview with NAS Media, he said all crude oil extracted by ISIS was delivered to Turkey before the liberation of Tabqa and Raqqa, which had blocked the road between Aleppo and Idlib. Afterwards, the major destination became Homs, where ISIS and the Syrian regime exchanged oil in return for food, the ISIS member said.

US special operations forces captured a large amount of data when they raided the Deir Ezzor compound in eastern Syria in May 2015 that allegedly provided some tangible evidence for the Turkey-ISIS connection. The documents belonged to ISIS oil and gas official Fathi ben Awn ben Jildi Murad al-Tunisi (aka Abu Sayyaf), who was killed in the assault. A Western official familiar with the intelligence gathered would later tell The Guardian that it was no longer possible to deny the existence of direct engagement between Turkish officials and ranking ISIS members. “There are hundreds of flash drives and documents that were seized there,” the official told The Guardian. “They are being analysed at the moment, but the links are already so clear that they could end up having profound policy implications for the relationship between us and Ankara.” The paper quoted an unnamed ISIS terrorist who said Turkey would not attack ISIS “too hard” due to the oil dependence.

Razeek Radeek Maksimo, an Azerbaijani national and former senior ISIS commander, said: “Oil and gas obtained by the Islamic State was sold to Turkey and the Syrian regime. … [Oil] was sold to Turkey through the Free Syrian Army (FSA).” Luay al-Khatteeb, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, also asserted that while some of the fuel was sold or distributed in Syria and Iraq, the rest was smuggled to southern Turkey. “It’s the only export market that Islamic State has.”

An academic study by George Kiourktsoglou and Dr. Alec D. Coutroubis from the University of Greenwich provided further clues of Turkey’s involvement in ISIS oil smuggling. It was like a piece of investigative journalism, written in a professional style. The authors suggested possible evidence of an illicit supply chain that ships ISIS crude from the port of Ceyhan in southeastern Turkey. The primary research pointed to a considerably active “shadow network of crude oil smugglers and traders” to transport ISIS’s oil from northeast Syria and northwest Iraq to Ceyhan. The authors guardedly wrote: “It seems that whenever the Islamic State is fighting in the vicinity of an area hosting oil assets, the exports from Ceyhan promptly spike. This may be attributed to an extra boost given to crude oil smuggling with the aim of immediately generating additional funds, badly needed for the supply of ammunition and military equipment. Unfortunately, in this case too, the authors cannot be categorical. If there is a certainty within the context of this paper and given the clear and present danger of terrorism, it is the urgent need for further research.” The study implies that the ISIS oil was added to the oil produced by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to be re-exported through the existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.

A report by Rystad Energy commissioned by the Norwegian government should also be regarded as another serious contribution to the debate over Turkey’s role in the terrorists’ oil trade network. The report determined that most of the oil sold by ISIS was directly sold to Turkey.

Joseph Fallon, Islamic extremism expert and UK Defense Forum research associate, told Fox News an ISIS network of “venture capitalists” was carrying out oil trade through smuggling routes across Syria, Iraq and Turkey, where they then bribe or threaten government officials to accept their oil and get paid market prices. He said when mixed with the oil in legitimate pipelines, it becomes untraceable. In other words, people would unknowingly use ISIS oil.

Although they vary in detail, all these stories, studies and witness statements share the same common point, which is Turkey’s active tolerance of ISIS’s rise and the facilitative and even sometimes active role in the oil trade, which served as a lifeline for ISIS. As to how this trade was being carried out, a few pieces of investigative journalism are worth remembering. At this point, we must also remember journalist Serena Shim, a US citizen of Lebanese origin, reporting from the field on the Syrian civil war. She was killed in a car accident in October 2014, a day after she said she had been threatened by the Turkish intelligence agency for reporting that ISIS and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters were crossing the Turkish border by truck. The circumstances surrounding her death are still a mystery.

UNCLE FARID

Al-Araby al-Jadeed, a London-based outlet owned by Fadaat Media of Qatar, investigated and ran a detailed report on how ISIS oil reaches international markets, largely relying on the account of an anonymous colonel from the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Up to 100 tankers at a time carrying ISIS oil were shuttling between Nineveh and Zakho, a Kurdish city about 90 kilometers north of Mosul, just below the Turkish Iraqi border.

These trucks were met by oil smuggling mafias that were a mix of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, Turks and Iranians. They competed with each other to purchase the oil. The competition was so fierce that assassinations among these competing gangs became routine. The highest bidder would pay between 10 and 25 percent of the oil’s value in US dollars as an advance payment.

Drivers who had permits to carry oil into Turkey took over these trucks, and the other drivers returned to the ISIS-controlled oil extraction points in empty trucks to repeat the cycle. Drivers that took the road to Turkey first stopped by rudimentary, privately owned refineries to process the crude oil. The processed oil was then transported into Turkey through the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing. Bribes were key to passage, the colonel said, adding that the trucks would reach the town of Silopi to be delivered to a shady person who went by the aliases of Dr. Farid and Uncle Farid.

Farid is an interesting figure with dual Greek-Israeli nationality, always protected by two strongly built bodyguards and never allowing himself to be photographed. Still, al-Araby had an identikit of this person based on descriptions by people who had seen him.

HANDS TIED

The New York Times wrote on September 13, 2014 that the Obama administration was trying to choke off the ISIS oil trade by means of various measures but was unable to convince Turkey to do more to curb the flow of this oil into its black market. The news relied on the statements of Western intelligence officials who tracked down oil shipments as they moved across Iraq and into Turkey’s southern border regions. American forces were reluctant to attack the tankers carrying this oil, although a senior administration official said it remained an option, the story noted. However, Turkey would hardly take any action against ISIS, this official argued. He thought that was because ISIS was holding 49 Turkish citizens, some of whom were diplomats, hostage in Mosul, and the terrorist group would retaliate by slaughtering them without hesitation in the event of an attack by Turkey.

However, many would argue that this was a consequence of the lax Turkish attitude towards ISIS and its tolerance from the beginning that had eventually led to this calamity. James Phillips, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, argued that Turkey did not crack down on ISIS’s oil network because it benefits from a lower price for oil and that some government officials might be capitalizing on the clandestine trade.

In October 2014, David Cohen, the US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the US Treasury, summarized the actual picture in a speech: “According to our information, as of last month, ISIS was selling oil at substantially discounted prices to a variety of middlemen, including some from Turkey, who then transported the oil to be resold. It also appears that some of the oil emanating from territory where ISIS operates has been sold to Kurds in Iraq, and then resold into Turkey. And in a further indication of the Assad regime’s depravity, it seems the Syrian government has made an arrangement to purchase oil from ISIS. … we estimate that beginning in mid-June, ISIS has earned approximately $1 million a day from oil sales.”

Financial Times also ran a story titled “Isis Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorists” on the same day as Cohen’s speech. The story, an extended version of which was also published as an e-book, basically assessed how ISIS had risen as a full-fledged conglomerate that employs workers, engineers and even professional managers to run its oil business. Like the US Treasury official Szubin, this article also estimated that the terrorist organization’s revenues were about $1.5 million daily, amounting to a monthly figure of around $40 million.

The story, which was published almost 40 days before the downing of the jet and the ensuing chaos in Russian-Turkish relations, did not name Turkey as one of the destinations of the ISIS oil but instead said a majority of the oil was consumed locally. Even the factions fighting against ISIS were buying oil from ISIS. “It’s a situation that makes you laugh and cry,” FT quoted a Syrian rebel commander in Aleppo as saying. “But we have no other choice, and we are a poor man’s revolution. Is anyone else offering to give us fuel?”

The FT article cited sources from the Syrian regime as well as the rebel groups as saying that both the Syrian forces and the insurgents, who are in a fight with ISIS,are reliant on the oil sold by ISIS. One oil trader said: “At any moment, the diesel can be cut. No diesel — Isis knows our life is completely dead.”


ISIS’S OIL BUSINESS IN FIGURES

There are no definite figures concerning the amount of cash inflow to ISIS coffers from its oil operations, but estimates have varied between $1.1 million and $3 million a day. As of October 2015 the total amount of production in Syria and Iraq was estimated to be between 34,000 bpd and 40,000 bpd daily. As Russia and the US intensified their airstrikes on ISIS-controlled zones, particularly targeting their oil producing facilities, production was almost halved. In 2016, parallel to the retreat of the terrorist group from its strongholds in eastern Syria and northern Iraq, it lost control of the oil wells. This precipitated the dissolution of ISIS and paved the way to its demise.

FAMILY BUSINESS

Probably the most scathing aspect of the Russian salvo about Turkey’s role in ISIS’s oil trade was its inclusion of Erdoğan’s family members, in particular son Bilal Erdoğan and son-in-law Berat Albayrak. Bilal’s rise to prominence in business from basically nothing and his wealth and connections had already garnered extensive criticism, but this time he was at the center of Russian autocrat Putin’s fierce bashing. Adding insult to injury, he was attacked head-on by Putin as a supporter of one of the most horrific terrorist groups in history.

http://www.turkey-isis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/erdo%C4%9Fan-and-Bilal-.jpg
President Erdoğan and his son Bilal

An abundance of stories about Bilal Erdoğan and the Maltese shipping company BMZ (derived from the initials of its three partners: President Erdoğan’s son Bilal, his brother Mustafa and his sister’s husband Zeki) quickly flooded newspapers and websites. In a nutshell, almost all the articles repeated a Russian allegation with varying degrees of detail: A company named Powertrans, which the Russians claimed had shady connections with Albayrak, was transporting Kurdish oil commingled with crude from ISIS-controlled wells to Ceyhan, from where Bilal’s ships were delivering it to such markets as Israel, Italy and Japan. It should be noted that while not all these claims were true, they were also not entirely false. But mixing mere speculation with seemingly hard evidence unavoidably boosted the authenticity of the evidence, which some found to be a smoking gun.

Bilal Erdoğan rejected all these claims in a full-page interview with Corriera della Sera in December 2015 in Italy, where he had moved on the pretext of furthering his education after facing embezzlement charges in the December 17/25 corruption investigations in Turkey. He said BMZ was not a transportation company but operated largely in the construction business. This was not true. His company had ships, and these ships, until they were sold to SOCAR in 2017 in a secret deal, could be easily tracked as they were actively used in transportation. The Malta Files also showed that Bilal’s company owned a $25 million oil tanker after an Azeri billionaire bought it and gifted it to BMZ. BMZ’s ships were sold in 2017.

The Russian assertions brought Powertrans into the limelight, too. Although it was at the heart of the alleged oil smuggling scheme, not much was known about the company except that it was favored by President Erdoğan. The Turkish government banned any kind of foreign trade or transfer of oil or its byproducts into or out of Turkey with a bill on July 18, 2011, which was published on the Official Gazette on November 11, 2011 following the first cabinet meeting after the general election. Yet the same bill authorized the government to exempt a company if it believed this would be for the benefit of the nation. Relying on this authority, Erdoğan allowed Powertrans to transport northern Iraqi oil to Turkey without even holding a public tender.

Turkish hacker group RedHack’s release of numerous emails belonging to Berat Albayrak bore out the accusations of the Erdoğan family’s meddling in the ISIS oil smuggling scheme. The Turkish government almost immediately had a court order issued imposing a broadcast ban on the content of these emails.A number of them came from Powertrans managers, asking about internal affairs of the company, such as recruiting certain personnel or informing about some business developments. Although Albayrak, who was the energy minister by the time he received these emails, had no affiliation on paper with Powertrans, he was asked or notified about even minor details of the company’s operations. Just to give an example, in one of these emails a Çalık Holding director who also had no apparent relation to Powertrans wrote: “Powertrans demands that the commuter benefit be increased by TL 5 in line with the new ticket fees. I submit this for your approval. Yours respectfully.” Even a minor issue such as commuter benefits was forwarded for Albayrak’s approval. A side note: Albayrak was Çalık Holding’s CEO for six years between 2007 and 2013. This holding is known to have very close relations with President Erdoğan.

Powertrans has been enigmatic for many people interested in the convoluted web of relations in the Middle East energy arena. Its ownership structure is not clear. No one knows exactly how it was able to secure its position as the sole holder of the right to transport oil from the KRG region by land and why Erdoğan was particularly attentive to extending the duration of privileges granted to this company. The conditions under which the relationship between Powertrans and Genel Energy, which is the largest holder of reserves in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, began are vague. Besides all these points, however, Russia was clear that Powertrans played a crucial role in “laundering” ISIS oiland was connected to Erdoğan’s family.

The leaked emails seemed to provide some proof of this. They showed Albayrak was the person running this company behind the scenes. In another email dated August 9, 2015, Albayrak’s cousin Ekrem Keleş informed him about the company’s marketing issues in northern Iraq.

Similarly in another email exchange with his lawyer, Albayrak discusses the proper language to deny all ties with Powertrans. The lawyer suggests “My client no longer has any ties with Powertrans.” Albayrak responds: “What does this mean? I have no ties with these companies in any way.” Albayrak would publicly deny his connections with this company several times, but the Russians were not buying his disclaimer. Remember Antonov’s harsh rant: “In the West, no one has asked questions about the fact that the Turkish president’s son heads one of the biggest energy companies, or that his son-in-law has been appointed energy minister. What a marvelous family business!”

ISIS IDEOLOGY REMAINS A THREAT

ISIS caught fire in a place with highly fragmented societies fraught with hate and ignorance, and bedlam broke loose, with reverberations shaking the entire world. It was elated over victories that no other terrorist group had ever achieved, straddling large swathes of land across two countries, enjoying a huge inflow of money into its coffers… Yet it was doomed to perish at the hands of the world’s major powers. ISIS has been militarily defeated, although it has not been exterminated and may again be revived given the ideological and sociological wreckage in the Middle East that had once caused it to emerge. Yet questions concerning its relations during its heyday still linger.

There is no doubt that Turkey tolerated ISIS when it first started to thrive. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s statement in a TV interview that although ISIS was a radicalized terrorist organization, the people joining its ranks were “enraged” young outsiders and Sunni Arabs who were shunned and cast aside politically by the Shiite rulers of Iraq may hint at Turkey’s overall approach to the issue at the time. Turkey basically handled the Syrian dynamic with a broader approach based on two pillars: dethrone Assad at all costs and never allow the Kurds to achieve a recognized political existence, let alone a state.

Turkey’s borders were effectively porous for ISIS transit between 2011 and mid-2014, when the terrorist group captured Mosul. The evidence included in this article has shown how easily jihadi extremists poured into Syria through Turkey during this time. Turkey started to toughen its position against ISIS only later in 2014, restricting border passage and even arresting some ISIS members inside Turkey or at the border gates. But still, the measures were not very harsh, and the detainees were quickly released despite their obvious connections to ISIS. And although border controls have been tightened, a 100-kilometer stretch of its 900-kilometer border with Syria was not sealed at all.

More evidence continues to come to light with the confessions of ISIS captives who tell of the lucrative business the militant group conducted with Turkey while officials looked the other way or in some cases helped meet ISIS demands on a quid pro quo basis.

Russia raised these questions concerning Turkey’s ties with ISIS, especially the oil trade, with serious assertions. The US and NATO both rushed to Turkey’s defense. In the end, Turkey turned its back on its long-time allies and stood with Russia. This alone tells us about the veracity of the Russian accusations. Ironically, the same Antonov who accused Erdoğan and his son and son-in-law of being accomplices in ISIS terrorism was accorded a warm welcome at an exhibition hosted by the Turkish Embassy in Washington in 2019 to commemorate those who lost their lives during the failed coup. Months after accusing Erdoğan of personally ordering the shooting down of the Russian jet to protect the ISIS oil trade, Putin would start behaving like Erdoğan’s best friend. Today these two leaders walk in lockstep and use the same discourse in major international affairs, appearing to be two pals who collaboratively contribute to the formation and advance of the institutions of a modern autocracy. Perhaps Russia knows Erdoğan’s secrets and uses them as leverage to influence Turkish policy and annoy NATO allies. One cannot help but question if Erdoğan, who cannot tolerate even moderate criticism, would be able to swallow Russia’s insults if the claims had no truth to them.

Turkey-ISIS Research Project

Former Commander Reveals Turkey’s Close Ties with ISIS in Syria

https://www.mintpressnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/AP_18028651817040.jpg

A former ISIS commander nicknamed the “ISIS ambassador to Turkey” has revealed the terror groups expansive liaisons with Turkish Intelligence

In an explosive interview, a former ISIS commander has claimed that the terror group cooperated directly with Turkish state intelligence agencies for years on areas of “common interest”.

The source said that senior Turkish government officials had numerous meetings with ISIS representatives to coordinate activities and that this also involved providing support and safe harbour to foreign fighters in the country. President Erdogan “was working hand in glove with ISIS” according to the US government counter-terrorism consultants who interviewed the ex-ISIS official.

The relationship raises questions about Turkey’s role as a NATO ally in the Syria conflict.

The source, who served as an ISIS emir for three years, Abu Mansour al Maghrebi, was interviewed by Professor Anne Speckhard, director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) and a long-time US government counter-terrorism consultant for NATO, the CIA, FBI, State Department and Pentagon, as well as by Dr Ardian Shajkovci, the ICSVE’s director of research.

Although not all of al-Maghrebi’s claims can be verified, most of them are corroborated by the claims of other whistleblowers and former ISIS personnel as previously reported by INSURGE.

Speckhard and Shakovci described Abu Mansour as a sort of ISIS diplomat to Turkey based in Raqqa, Syria.

“My issue[duties] was our [Islamic State’s] relationship with Turkish intelligence. Actually, this started when I was working at the borders,” he explained.

https://www.mintpressnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/abu-Mansour_edited.jpg
Abu Mansour al Maghrebi.

Originally from Morocco, Abu Mansour was an electrical engineer who went to Syria in 2013 to join ISIS. His first job with the terror group involved handling foreign fighters coming to join ISIS via Turkey. This involved liaising with a network of ISIS-paid operatives inside Turkey who would direct fighters from Istanbul to the Turkish border towns of Gaziantep, Antakya, Sanliurfa, and so on.

“Most of them were paid by Dawlah[ISIS],” Abu Mansour said, but said that those working in Turkey were usually motivated by money rather than ideology. But he acknowledged: “Many in Turkey believe and give their bayat [oath of allegiance] to Dawlah. There are ISIS guys living in Turkey, individuals and groups, but no armed groups inside Turkey.”

Abu Mansour later travelled to Raqqa in 2015 where he facilitated Turkish medical treatment of ISIS fighters after high-level meetings with Turkish state intelligence. Abu Mansour claimed to have received his orders straight from Mohamed Hodoud, a representative of ISIS’ Majlis al Shura, and also to have briefly met the terror group’s elusive leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He told his interviewers:

There were some agreements and understandings between the Turkish intelligence and ISIS emni about the border gates, for the people who got injured. I had direct meeting with the MIT [the Turkish National Intelligence Organization], many meetings with them.

He added that these regular meetings occurred between a range of agencies, including Turkish intelligence and the Turkish military:

There were teams. Some represent the Turkish intel, some represent the Turkish Army. There were teams from 3–5 different groups. Most meetings were in Turkey in military posts or their offices. It depended on the issue. Sometimes we meet each week. It depends on what was going on. Most of the meetings were close to the borders, some in Ankara, some in Gaziantep.

Abu Mansour described having complete impunity to travel between Syria and Turkey, leading Speckhard to describe him as in effect an ISIS ‘Ambassador’. “I passed the borders and they let me pass”, he said. “[At the border], the Turks always sent me a car and I’m protected. A team of two to three people from our side were with me. I was in charge of our team most of the time.”

Although Abu Mansour denied being a “big guy”, he admitted that his reach on behalf of ISIS potentially extended to President Erdogan himself:

I was about to meet him but I did not. One of his intelligence officers said Erdogan wants to see you privately but it didn’t happen.

The interview with Abu Mansour was published on March 18th2019 in Homeland Security Today, the magazine of the Government & Technology Services Coalition (GTSC) — a trade association of CEOs including former US government officials which work in the US national security sector.

A strategic partnership

Abu Mansour argued that his role was to coordinate a relationship between ISIS and Turkey where “both sides benefit.” Abu Mansour said that Turkey saw ISIS as a strategic tool to expand Turkey’s influence in northern Syria as the centre for a renewed empire:

We are in the border area and Turkey wants to control its borders — to control Northern Syria. Actually they had ambitions not only for controlling the Kurds. They wanted all the north, from Kessab (the most northern point of Syria) to Mosul… This is the Islamists’ ideology of Erdogan. They wanted all of the north of Syria. That is what the Turkish side said [they wanted], to control the north of Syria, because they have their real ambitions. Actually, we talked about what Erdogan said in public [versus what he really desired.] This part of Syria is part of the Ottoman states. Before the agreement following the Second World War, Aleppo and Mosul were part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The agreement Sykes Picot [in which they lost these regions] was signed for one hundred years. In our meetings, we talked about reestablishing the Ottoman Empire. This was the vision of Turkey.

Abu Mansour added that although this vision was routinely attributed to Erdogan was not necessarily shared across the Turkish government:

I cannot say that this is the vision of the whole Turkish government. Many are against interfering to bring this project to reality. They say we will try to defeat the PKK and Kurds. We are afraid of the union between Kurds and that they may make a Kurdish state, but they also expanded to Aleppo… Since they are a NATO state they cannot make NATO angry against them. So, they cannot deal directly with the situation, but they want to destroy the Kurdish ummah, so they deal with the situation [via ISIS] and get benefits from the Islamic State.

ISIS saw the covert alliance with Turkey as a “big benefit”, as “they could protect our back. Approximately 300 km of our border is with them. Turkey is considered a road for us for medications, food — so many things enter in the name of aid. The gates were open.”


Turkey’s open gate with ISIS

ISIS fighters routinely obtained medical treatment in Turkish hospitals across the border. The Turkish government also supplied water to the terror group and allowed it to sell tens of millions of dollars of oil via Turkey.

“We negotiated to send our fighters to the hospitals [in Turkey]”, said Abu Mansour. “There was facilitation — they didn’t look at the passports of those coming for treatment. It was always an open gate. If we had an ambulance we could cross without question. We could cross [into Turkey] at many places. They don’t ask about official identities. We just have to let them know.”

Turkish state intelligence was intimately involved in this process, he claimed:

The MIT was made aware of every critical situation and they sent the ambulances to the border. There were also hospitals close to the border. Those who received critical care were treated there and they [the MIT] sent the others all over Turkey depending on their needs. There were very interested doctors, Syrian and Turkish, who wanted to help. So, if there were not facilities to serve them on the border, they would be sent further into Turkey for this.

Medical bills were largely paid for by ISIS, but “some Turkish public hospitals took these fighters for free. It was not only for our fighters but also for the victims of bombings. I don’t know how many were treated in Turkey, but it was routine… I just know this agreement to open the gates for our wounded and that there were ambulances sent for them. It was a ‘state- to- state’ agreement regarding our wounded. I negotiated these agreements. For the wounded, medical and other supplies to pass, and I negotiated about water also, the Euphrates.”

Water supplied by Turkey allowed ISIS to farm and even generate electricity from dams:

Actually we [Syria] had an agreement with Turkey for 400 cubic meters per second [of water] into Syria. After the revolution, they started to decrease the quantity of water to 150 cubic meters per second. After our negotiations [in 2014] it returned to 400. We needed it for electrical power and as a vital source of living.

ISIS water agreement with Turkey “took a long time to negotiate,” according to Abu Mansour. In return, ISIS gave the Turkish government guarantees that the country would be “safe and stable” from ISIS attack. “In negotiations, I could not say I would attack Turkey. This is the language of gangs, but I would say we will try to keep Turkey from the field battle, we will not see Turkey as an enemy. They understood what we are talking about. We said many times, ‘You are not our enemy and not our friend.’”

Abu Mansour further claimed Turkey was the primary conduit for ISIS oil sales: “Most of the Syrian oil was going to Turkey, and just small amounts went to the Bashar regime…. This happened spontaneously. There are many traders to do that and Turkey was the only market in which to send oil. Their traders paid for the oil that went into Turkey.”

https://www.mintpressnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Fullscreen-capture-12292015-113235-AM.jpg
A photograph released by Russian intelligence depicting thousands of trucks laden with oil crossing from Syria into Turkey. December, 2015.

Most of these deals occurred via Turkish middleman who were sanctioned by the authorities:

Oil that went to the Syrian government — some went by pipes, some by trucks. Oil sent by Dawlah [ISIS] to Turkey was arranged by traders from Turkey who came to take the oil with our permissions. Traders came from the Syrian side also.

Oil sales via Turkey, Abu Mansour confirmed, were instrumental in bankrolling ISIS’ military onslaught. “In Syria the oil was enough to pay for the weapons and everything needed,” he said. “[Our oil revenues] were more than 14 million dollars per month and half of this oil money is more than enough to pay for everything needed for our weapons expenditures.”

These claims lend credence to an earlier investigation by INSURGE into ISIS oil sales which raised questions not just about Turkish state complicity, but also that of a number of Iraqi Kurdish and Western companies.

However, Abu Mansour denied that ISIS received weapons or funding directly from Turkey. Instead he claimed that weapons were routinely obtained by ISIS from sources inside armed opposition groups: “Anti-government Syrian people provided us with weapons; many mafias and groups traded weapons to us.”

A familiar story

Abu Mansour’s claims about Turkish military intelligence’s direct support for ISIS have been corroborated by other sources. In 2016, I interviewed Ahmet Sait Yayla, Chief of the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Division of Turkish National Police between 2010 and 2012, who went on to become Chief of the Public Order and Crime Prevention Division until 2014.

Yayla told me in extensive detail how he had witnessed first-hand that his own police counter-terrorism operations were scuppered due to Turkish intelligence liaisons which protected ISIS fighters, routinely granted them free passage in and out of Turkey, and provided them medical treatment in Turkish hospitals.

He had however gone much further in describing how he had seen evidence of direct Turkish military and financial sponsorship for some ISIS operations. Yayla’s detailed testimony suggests that Abu Mansour’s role as chief negotiator with Turkish intelligence did not cover certain key strategic issues such as direct military and financial support, which would explain why Abu Mansour was not aware of it.

My story on Yayla was banned in a Turkish court order last year sent to US tech and social media companies.

INSURGE previously reported other emerging evidence from Western intelligence sources indicating Turkish state complicity in the expansion of ISIS across Syria.

The new revelations reinforce questions about why Western governments have ignored the evidence of state-sponsorship of ISIS — within NATO no less — despite international laws requiring firm action against entities found to be supporting terrorism.

The double game

In 2014, Abu Mansour alleges that Turkey was allowing foreign fighters into Syria while pretending to take measures against them:

Turkey wanted to make it easy for foreign fighters to cross the borders… They just want to control, they need to be known, and how they enter, so they ask me to tell who has entered and where. Actually, the Turkish side said, ‘You should reduce, change the way you do it, the way you cross. For example, don’t come with a group to enter because it’s clear that a bunch of people entered. Enter only specific gates. Come without any weapons. Don’t come with long beards. Your entry from north to south should be hidden as much as possible.

Once again, Turkish intelligence was directly involved: “[In 2014,] they opened some legal gates under the eye of Turkish intel that our people went in and out through. But, entry into Syria was easier than return to Turkey. Turkey controlled the movements.”

ISIS terrorist attacks in Turkey orchestrated by Turkish MIT agents?

Perhaps Abu Mansour’s most controversial claim is that ISIS attacks inside Turkey — on Istanbul airport, at the Reina nightclub and on the streets in Ankara and Istanbul — were not in ISIS’ own interests, but were likely carried out under the orders of Turkish intelligence officers who had infiltrated ISIS:

The ISIS external emni ordered it. And I think that there were Turkish MIT guys inside the external emni. I suspected that the striking at the airport was not for the benefit of IS, but Turkish groups of IS who wanted to strike Turkey, or they were affected by other agencies that don’t want a relationship between Dawlah and Turkey. It makes no sense, otherwise, because most of our people came through that airport.

His explanation for this is that the orders for the attack did not come from ISIS leadership proper, but from Turkish MIT officers:

These orders for these attacks in Turkey were from those MIT guys inside Dawlah but not from our political side. They didn’t want to destroy Erdogan, just change his road in the matter of the Syrian issue. They wanted him to use his army to attack Syria, and to attack Dawlah. The airport attack makes a good excuse for him to come into Syria.

To be sure, there is no way to independently verify Abu Mansour’s extraordinary allegations against Turkish state intelligence, but they are partly corroborated by the claims of another former ISIS operative, Savas Yildas, who was captured by the YPG during the ISIS attack on the Kurdish province of Gire Spi (Tel Abyad) in Syria. Abu Mansour added that during his imprisonment in Kurdish YPG prisons, he had heard “that the Turkish government, after they were in Raqqa, took 40 persons out that were part of Turkish security agencies.”

The new revelations contradict years of a conventional narrative which has portrayed ISIS as a spontaneous movement erupting without significant state support.

Turkey is hardly the only state which Western intelligence agencies knew were financing ISIS — others include Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Top photo | Turkey-backed Syrian rebels and Turkish troops secure the Bursayah hill, which separates the Kurdish-held enclave of Afrin from the Turkey-controlled town of Azaz, Syria, Jan. 28, 2018. Photo | AP

Source | Insurge Intelligence

MPN News

Niederlande lehnt Untersuchungen zu IS-Türkei Verbindungen ab

Nachdem ein Bericht des Rojava Information Center 40 Soldaten des Islamischen Staates in den Rängen der Freien Syrischen Armee identifizieren konnte, stellte ein Abgeordneter einen Antrag auf eine Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und dem Islamischen Staat.

Der niederländische Außenminister Stef Blok erklärte am Mittwoch, seine Regierung werde sich nicht für eine NATO-Untersuchung zu möglichen Verbindungen der Türkei zum Islamischen Staat einsetzen. Dieser Erklärung geht eine Anfrage des niederländischen Abgeordneten Raymond de Roon voraus, in der er die Regierung dazu auffordert zu klären, ob die Türkei ehemalige Mitglieder des Islamischen Staates angeworben, ausgebildet und bewaffnet habe.
Raymond de Roon stellte diese Anfrage, nachdem das Rojava Information Center (RIC) einen Bericht veröffentlichte, der 40 Soldaten der von der Türkei unterstützten Freien Syrischen Armee in Afrin, als ehemalige IS Soldaten identifiziert.

In einer schriftlichen Erklärung betont der niederländische Außenminister Stef Blok „Die Türkei ist und bleibt ein wichtiger Partner im Kampf gegen den IS. Die Türkei ist ernsthaft vom ISIS-Terrorismus betroffen und geht dagegen vor.“
Die Niederlande werde sich deshalb nicht für eine Untersuchung zu den Verbindungen zwischen der Türkei und dem Islamischen Staat aussprechen. Die niederländische Regierung betonte außerdem, dass die NATO-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei nicht in Frage gestellt wird.

Das niederländische Außenministerium erklärt die Identifizierung der 40 IS-Soldaten durch „dynamische Faktoren im syrischen Bürgerkrieg“ die „pragmatische oder finanzielle Gründe“ hervorrufen können, die dazu führen das Soldaten des Islamischen Staates „ideologisch entgegengesetzten Fraktionen beitreten“.
Das niederländische Außenministerium erklärt zeitgleich seine Ansicht, dass die von der Türkei geführte Freie Syrische Armee, das ideologische Gegenteil vom Islamischen Staat ist. Dabei sind sich Experte einig das die Ideologische Brandbeite der FSA und des IS sich in nur wenigen Punkten unterscheidet, sie jedoch die gleiche Auffassung einer Gesellschaftsform und Regierungsform gekoppelt an dem Islam haben.

Der niederländische Abgeordnete de Roon äußerte jedoch sein Bedenken, dass die Türkei den Soldaten des Islamischen Staates, innerhalb der Freien Syrischen Armee eine Art „Sicherheitszone“ bieten könnte.
Die in Syrien lebende Forscherin Chloe Troadec erklärte zunächst, sie sei erfreut zu sehen, dass ihr Bericht „Identifizierung von 40 ehemaligen ISIS-Mitgliedern, die jetzt zu den von der Türkei unterstützten Dschihadisten in Afrin gehören“ auf parlamentarischer Ebene wahrgenommen wurde. Sie erklärte daraufhin, dass die Antworten von Herrn Blok in mehreren Punkten „Mangelhaft“ sind.
„Erstens sagt Herr Blok, dass diese Gruppen die `ideologischen Gegner´ des IS sind. In der Realität sind die Gruppen wie die Jaysh-al-Islam und die Ahrar-al-Sham, die die Hauptkomponente der von der Türkei bewaffneten, finanzierten und kontrollierten Streitkräfte bilden und Afrin besetzen, ideologisch nicht vom Islamischen Staat zu unterscheiden sind.“
Chloe Troadec verwies auch auf einen am Donnerstag veröffentlichten UN-Bericht, der zeigt, dass diese Fraktionen für Kriegsverbrechen und die Durchsetzung einer extremistischen, gewaltsamen und frauenfeindlichen Auslegung des Scharia-Gesetzes verantwortlich sind. Sie verwies ebenfalls darauf, dass die Niederländer einer der größten europäischen Investoren in der Türkei sind und am 11. September ein gemeinsames Treffen der beiden Länder zum Thema Handel stattfand.
„Solange diese finanziell lukrativen Beziehungen bestehen, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass die niederländische oder eine andere europäische Regierung ernsthaft gegen die Türkei als wichtigster staatlicher Sponsor von Terror in der Region, vorgehen wird“.

Rojava News

‘RELIGIOUS CONVERSION’ ON A LIVE TV PROGRAM

HDP MP Paylan: This is Child Abuse, I Will File a Criminal Complaint

The family of the child, for whom Nihat Hatipoğlu organized a religious conversion ritual, told HDP Diyarbakır MP Garo Paylan that nobody asked them for a permission.

Theologist Nihat Hatipoğlu on his live TV program at İstanbul Sultanahmet Square converted the religion of a 13-year-old Armenian refugee boy through a religious conversion ritual from Christianity to Islam on May 12.

Hatipoğlu said that the permission was given by the child’s mother. However, Peoples‘ Democratic Party (HDP) MP Garo Paylan has said that he talked to the family and the family told him that they have not given a permission for the conversion. Paylan has stated that he will file criminal complaint.

Paylan, whom we called to learn the details of the phone call with the family and of the criminal complaint, has stated that the family got contact with him:

„The child’s mother was very unhappy, they were very sorry as the family, because they are face to face with a child abuse towards their child. The mother has not been informed about this incident.


‚It was obviously outside of the parent’s knowledge‘

„One of the assistants of Nihap Hatioğlu has called the mother; yet, she could not respond to the phone call as she was in the market at that moment. Her Turkish is already not very good.

„She has learned that her child was a guest in the program. However, she stated that it was outside of her knowledge that her child would be on television, such an incident would happen and he would be converted to Islam. The gravity of the situation is that it cannot happen despite the parent’s information. This is an incident of child abuse. It was obviously outside of the parent’s knowledge.

„We have an open wound for hundred years. During the genocide, many relatives of mine got lost, disappeared and died on the migratory routs. Some of them went to the Muslim families.


‚A lot of Islamicized Armenians in many families“

„Now, wherever I go in that region, everybody says, ‚My grandfather is Armenian, my grandmother is Armenian‘. Every family there has at least one Islamicized Armenian or some villages were forcefully converted to Islam.

„It surely means the making an open wound bleed again because in Anatolia, a very high number of people have been Islamicized forcefully.


‚Religious conversion can be through free will‘

„This child was faced with an attempt of forced Islamicization. An individual can choose his/her belief with a free will after the age of 18.

„A child can have a belief, too. She/he is baptized early in the Christianity, the religious education is given in early ages in Islam, yet the religious conversion of a child should be through a free will.

„I will file a criminal complaint today (May 15) because this TV program has obviously violated the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. I will also lodge a complaint about this program to the Radio Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and a complaint against Nihap Hatioğlu to the prosecutor’s office.

„I will also get in touch with the Minister of Family and Social Services Ministry and talk about the precautions to be taken to protect our children in any time. I will make a demand for the increase of precautions about Arthur and the refugee/immigrant children living in this country like Arthur, and I will ask the Minister to look after Arthur.“

Bianet

American magazine: Turkey is safe haven for money, gold of Daesh

A report by The Atlantic Monthly on the vaguely secret ways of transferring money says that some of these funds are held in cash by individuals in Turkey, while some of them have also been invested in gold

The writer David Kenar said: If you’re looking to transfer money here, there’s a chance you will be directed to Abu Shawkat. He works out of a small office in a working-class suburb of the Lebanese capital, but won’t give you its exact location. Instead, he’ll direct you to a nearby alleyway.

The writer said Abu Shawkat—not his real name—is part of the hawala system, which is often used to transfer cash between places where the banking system has broken down or is too expensive for some to access.

According to the magazine thus, cash can travel across borders without any inquiry into who is sending or receiving it, or its purpose.

The group remains a financial powerhouse: It still has access to hundreds of millions of dollars, according to experts’ estimates, and can rely on a battle-tested playbook to keep money flowing into its coffers. That continued wealth has real risks, threatening to help it retain the allegiance of a committed core of loyalists and wreak havoc through terrorist attacks for years to come.

The writer said that the Islamic State’s financial strength offers a window into the broader challenge facing the United States and other governments….

The writer added that in its effort to squeeze the group financially, Washington has been forced to rely on a fundamentally different strategy than it employed in its military campaign: The main weapons at its disposal are not air strikes and artillery barrages, but subtler tools, such as sanctioning Islamic State–linked businesses, denying them access to the international financial system, and quietly cooperating with governments across the globe. Successes will be less visible, the campaign against the group will likely take years, and there is no guarantee of victory.

The end of the Islamic State’s days of holding and governing territory represents a double-edged sword for officials looking to starve it of resources. On the one hand, its dramatic losses have made it far more difficult for the group to rely on two major sources of revenue: the exploitation of oil fields in Iraq and Syria, and the taxation of citizens living under its rule. These methods played a key role in allowing the Islamic State to raise roughly $1 million a day, a senior Iraqi security official, who declined to be identified discussing intelligence issues, told me, transforming the group into the world’s richest terrorist organization.

On the other hand, the Islamic State’s loss of territory has freed it from the costs associated with trying to build its self-declared “caliphate,” allowing it to focus exclusively on terrorist activity. A U.S. Treasury Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the group is operating increasingly like its insurgent predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and no longer requires the same resources it did when it governed territory. Oil still brings in revenue too: While the Islamic State no longer controls individual fields, the Treasury official added that a key source of the group’s income is the extortion of oil-supply lines across the region.

The Islamic State is also still sitting on the massive windfall that it built up during the height of its power. “What we know is that they accumulated large amounts of cash and other assets,” said Howard Shatz, a senior economist at the Rand Corporation and co-author of several studies on the Islamic State’s finances. “We don’t know where it all went.”

The senior Iraqi security official told me that the bulk of the Islamic State’s assets had been transferred to Turkey, though the Treasury Department has sanctioned its money-services businesses in Syria and Iraq, which have connections as far away as the Caribbean. Some of these funds are reportedly held in cash by individuals in Turkey, while a portion has also been invested in gold. There is precedent for Ankara turning a blind eye toward the terrorist organization’s activity on its soil: The group used to make millions of dollars by selling smuggled oil to Turkish buyers. The October raid in Erbil also targeted the financial network built up by Fawaz Muhammad Jubayr al-Rawi, an Islamic State leader who the Treasury Department claims owned and operated Syria-based money-services businesses that exchanged money with Turkey. The Turkish government has consistently denied providing safe harbor to either Islamic State individuals or the group’s assets.

The war-ravaged states of Syria and Iraq also provide the Islamic State with ample opportunities to revive the tactics that financed its predecessor organization. From 2008 to 2012, when al-Qaeda in Iraq was driven underground, it operated much like a mafia: It skimmed construction contracts, particularly in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul; stole goods and resold them; and kidnapped members of wealthy families for ransom. Despite its straitened circumstances, the group was recording monthly revenues of nearly $1 million just in Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital, in late 2008 and early 2009.

Today it has even more factors working in its favor. The destruction of areas of northern Iraq once controlled by the Islamic State has necessitated a massive reconstruction effort. At a conference last year, countries pledged $30 billion to rebuild the area, a figure that is still well below what the Iraqi government said it needs. Perversely, such a massive injection of funds provides the Islamic State with even more opportunity to benefit from corruption. Declassified documents show that senior Iraqi, Kurdish, and Turkish politicians had dealings with al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2009; oversight of how funds are spent is likely even worse now, given the magnitude of the task. Second, the Islamic State kept meticulous records about the approximately 7 million to 8 million people living under its rule during the height of its power. If it retained control of those records, it could use them to extort Iraqis and Syrians.

“If you lived in ISIS territory, they know where you live, they know much money you make, and they know what your business is,” Shatz told me. “They can go to a businessman and say, ‘You must be very proud of your son. It would be a pity to see something happen to him.’”

Like any smart multinational conglomerate, the Islamic State has diversified its streams of revenue. Even if the United States and its allies manage to cut off, for example, the group’s kidnap-for-ransom business, it can turn to those commercial enterprises and extortion rackets.

The situation is far from hopeless. The United States has already made a dentin the Islamic State’s finances by targeting its oil network, and the group may find that its meticulous records can be used against it: Once captured, those records could provide a detailed overview of its personnel and sources of revenue. But there are no silver bullets.

Abu Shawkat’s market advantage is that he can send money to places where formal institutions have crumbled. The Islamic State’s business model relies on similar factors, only on a much grander scale. It aims to exploit state breakdown as a way to fund its main product: political violence. That violence then weakens the state further, creating more financial opportunities for the terrorist organization.

The military victory against the Islamic State is cause for celebration, but it also allows the group to fall back on an economic strategy that has served it well for years. Don’t expect it to go out of business anytime soon.

ANHA

The ISIS Ambassador to Turkey

In the complicated relationship between the government of Turkey and ISIS, it’s unclear how much of the relationship was direct and formal, as opposed to support coming from private individuals and entities in Turkey, or in response to the vast amounts of money ISIS had to spend on a network it deployed inside Turkey to receive and funnel foreign fighters, weapons, and medical supplies into its huge state apparatus. In any case, it’s clear that every state needs diplomats to negotiate political deals with the countries near its borders. ISIS, it seems, was no exception to this rule, as ICSVE researchers learned in a February 2019 five-hour interview with an ISIS emir, Abu Mansour al Maghrebi, who claims he essentially served as the ISIS ambassador to Turkey.

“My job in Raqqa was dealing with the international cases,” Abu Mansour al Maghrebi recalls of his three years serving ISIS. “My issue [duties] was our [Islamic State’s] relationship with Turkish intelligence. Actually, this started when I was working at the borders,” he explains, harking back to the first job he undertook for ISIS before becoming an ISIS emir and, seemingly, their ambassador to Turkey.

Abu Mansour, an electrical engineer from Morocco, came to Syria in 2013. Like many foreign fighters we interviewed, he stated he came hoping to unshackle Muslims from dictatorial regimes and build an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Islamic ideals. He traveled from Casablanca, Morocco, to Istanbul, Turkey, and through the southern border of Turkey into Syria. His first stop was Idlib, Syria, just as hostilities between al Nusra and ISIS had begun. Abu Mansour ended up on the ISIS side of that rift and was assigned by ISIS the job of an intake official on the Syrian side of the Turkish border. His job was to receive the steady flow of foreign fighters streaming into ISIS via Turkey – many who shared his same dream.

“My job was to direct operatives to receive the foreign fighters in Turkey,” Abu Mansour explains, referring to the network of ISIS-paid people who facilitated foreign fighter travel from Istanbul to the Turkish border towns of Gaziantep, Antakya, Sanliurfa, etc. “Most of them were paid by Dawlah [ISIS],” Abu Mansour explains, but differentiates them from ISIS members, due to their non-ideological motivations. “Most of those working on the Turkish side, their goal is money,” he said. Although when asked about ISIS networks inside Turkey, he also admits, “Many in Turkey believe and give their bayat [oath of allegiance] to Dawlah. There are ISIS guys living in Turkey, individuals and groups, but no armed groups inside Turkey.”

In addressing the foreign fighters, Abu Mansour explains: “[They came from] different places, from North Africa mostly. The numbers of Europeans was not a big number, 4,000 total.”

“Tunis 13,000, 4,000 from Morocco. There were less fighters from Libya because they had a front there [in Libya], fighting less than 1,000. I’m just talking about up to 2015,” he adds. Not surprisingly, his figures confirm data collected on the origins and numbers of foreign fighters who joined ISIS – that the most came from Tunisia. It was interesting how he can rattle off the numbers.

“So, you were more than a simple clerk working in the ISIS reception center registering new recruits?” I ask, suspecting he was much more important than that, given his grip on ISIS statistics.

“[My job was] guarding the borders between Syria and Turkey and to receive the fighters,” Abu Mansour explains, smiling at being recognized as more powerful than he was originally conveying. “I oversaw reception at Tal Abyad, Aleppo, Idlib, all their borders,” he answers.

It’s clear he was in charge, so I ask him, “So, you were an ISIS emir?”

“Yes,” he admits, seemingly happy to be “caught out” and recognized for who he really was. “At the beginning I was registering people, then I became the supervisor. I was the emir.”

The ISIS Foreign Fighters

We discuss the women who came into Syria via Turkey. “The single females, they go directly to Raqqa to the centers for singles. Married women go to their husbands,” he explains. He states that those wives [couples] stay in the ISIS female guesthouses: “Since they are family, they are offered a place to live until their husbands finish trainings.” He is referring to the ISIS military and weapons training and the ISIS “obligatory shariah training” in which new male recruits are taught the ISIS takfir ideology, an ideology that justifies use of violence against those considered heretics or unbelievers, including against fellow Muslims.

Abu Mansour explains the format and nature of intake forms that were filled out at the ISIS reception area. “It was a form about experience, countries you visited, etc. I don’t remember it very well, but it was very detailed,” he explains. He further continues, “There were several people who came with higher education. We wrote his discipline, his studies, his languages. These things were recorded on my forms.” According to Abu Mansour, job placements occurred after another intake took place inside the training camps. “At those places, there were very trusted people running the ISIS offices of recruiting, so if you say you’re an engineer, they put you to that kind of job. It was an office of human resources management,” he states, adding, “but of course different, because in ours we also had, ‘I want to be a martyr.’”

Martyrs and Those Returning to Become Sleeper Cells

Asked to explain what happens to those who came saying they wanted to “martyr” themselves, he answers, “There are specific centers interested in these things.

Before 2014 and 2015, a high number of them were willing to martyr themselves.” Abu Mansour explains that those who came to die for the Islamic Caliphate were more plentiful in the beginning. “Approximately 5,000 came to be martyrs. I didn’t send them to the center,” he states, referring to where the would-be suicide cadres were isolated and encouraged on their death missions. He further continues, “I only record him and send them to the training camp. Then there is a center in Raqqa. There is a central management who control who is assigned where. That was not my job.”

According to Abu Mansour, the numbers of would-be “martyrs” went down as the Caliphate was in fact established. “It started to go down as Raqqa stabilized. [Then,] most came simply to live. It was a small ratio of those who came to martyr themselves.” Adhering to his uncanny ability to remember exact recruiting figures, he explains, “Before 2014, 50 percent came to martyr themselves. Then it went under 20 percent.”

“During 2014 and 2015, we had approximately 35,000 [foreign fighters who] entered,” Abu Mansour recounts. “After that I don’t know, but the numbers declined each year,” he continues. His numbers match those of experts who estimate at least 40,000 foreign fighters went to Syria, most ending up in ISIS.

Concerning those who were invited by the ISIS emni to train and return to their home countries to attack, as was revealed by Harry Sarfo, an ISIS returnee incarcerated in Germany, and an ISIS smuggler speaking to ICSVE in February, who detailed some of those operations, Abu Mansour explains, “We are the point of reception. It was not our job to ask if they will return to attack. That was Raqqa’s job.”

Although he confirms that it did happen. “There were some who invited others to go back home and attack, but it was not our job; we were reception,” Abu Mansour repeats. “It exists, but not all the people who returned home [are sleeper cells]. Many simply quit the job. Many people didn’t like the situation and left,” he clarifies, putting some myth to the statements made by some that a large portion of the ISIS returnees in Europe may be part of sleeper cells. “There was a central management in Aleppo and in Raqqa,” Abu Mansour states, adding, “I turned the passports to them. They were archived.”

Becoming an ISIS Ambassador

“I went to Raqqa after the coalition assault against the border,” Abu Mansour recalls. “Eastern Syria got stability in Raqqa, etc.” This was in 2015 and 2016. When we ask Abu Mansour if injured ISIS fighters were allowed to cross the border and receive medical care in Turkey, things suddenly take another twist, as we realize that Abu Mansour was not only an emir, but an ISIS diplomat.

“There were some agreements and understandings between the Turkish intelligence and ISIS emni about the border gates, for the people who got injured,” Abu Mansour continues. “I had direct meeting with the MIT [the Turkish National Intelligence Organization], many meetings with them.”

When we ask who exactly in the Turkish government was meeting ISIS members, he states, “There were teams. Some represent the Turkish intel, some represent the Turkish Army. There were teams from 3-5 different groups. Most meetings were in Turkey in military posts or their offices. It depended on the issue. Sometimes we meet each week. It depends on what was going on. Most of the meetings were close to the borders, some in Ankara, some in Gaziantep.”

When he mentions meeting Turkish government officials in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, we suddenly upgrade him in our minds to an ISIS ambassador, which is indeed how he was functioning. “I passed the borders and they let me pass. [At the border,] the Turks always sent me a car and I’m protected. A team of two to three people from our side were with me. I was in charge of our team most of the time.”

Abu Mansour, it seems, was meeting high-level officials in all the security branches of the government, negotiating deals. “The subject of common benefits is a big subject,” Abu Mansour states, adding, “It’s a new thing when you create a state and separate it from the outside world. The negotiations were not easy. It took a long time. Sometimes it was hard.”

“I am not the big guy you are talking about,” says Abu Mansour, demurring at the idea that he was an ambassador of sorts. He stated ambassador is not a term they would have used in the Islamic State. Yet, as he continues, we learn that his “diplomatic” reach on behalf of ISIS extended even to the president of Turkey himself. “I was about to meet him but I did not. One of his intelligence officers said Erdogan wants to see you privately but it didn’t happen.”

Abu Mansour explains, “I got my orders from the representative of the Majlis al Shura, from Mohamed Hodoud, an Iraqi. The individuals of the [ISIS] shura have the highest authority; they create a negotiation committee, and delegates.” In regard to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Abu Mansour admits, “I saw him for a short while,” which is more than most ISIS members can say of the elusive leader who hid himself from almost everyone we have managed to interview (n=141 ISIS cadres).

The Islamic State’s Usefulness for Turkey

We ask if this was a funding relationship. “There was no changing money between us,” Abu Mansour answers, and agrees it was a coordinating function – diplomacy where “both sides benefit.” The benefit to Turkey, according to Abu Mansour, was that “we are in the border area and Turkey wants to control its borders – to control Northern Syria. Actually they had ambitions not only for controlling the Kurds. They wanted all the north, from Kessab (the most northern point of Syria) to Mosul.”

“This is the Islamists’ ideology of Erdogan,” Abu Mansour explains, adding, “They wanted all of the north of Syria. That is what the Turkish side said [they wanted], to control the north of Syria, because they have their real ambitions. Actually, we talked about what Erdogan said in public [versus what he really desired.] This part of Syria is part of the Ottoman states. Before the agreement following the Second World War, Aleppo and Mosul were part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The agreement Sykes Picot [in which they lost these regions] was signed for one hundred years. In our meetings, we talked about re-establishing the Ottoman Empire. This was the vision of Turkey.”

Abu Mansour makes it clear that what he was told in his meetings with Turks was put forward as President Erdogan’s vision, but that it was not necessarily shared by all: “I cannot say that this is the vision of the whole Turkish government. Many are against interfering to bring this project to reality. They say we will try to defeat the PKK and Kurds. We are afraid of the union between Kurds and that they may make a Kurdish state, but they also expanded to Aleppo,” he adds regarding Turkish aspirations inside Syria.

Abu Mansour continues, “Since they are a NATO state they cannot make NATO angry against them. So, they cannot deal directly with the situation, but they want to destroy the Kurdish ummah, so they deal with the situation [via ISIS] and get benefits from the Islamic State.”

On the side of ISIS, he explains, “It’s a big benefit to Dawlah, as they could protect our back. Approximately 300 km of our border is with them. Turkey is considered a road for us for medications, food – so many things enter in the name of aid. The gates were open.”

However, on the subject of getting arms from Turkey, Abu Mansour clears the Turks of any guilt, stating, “No one can accuse the Turkish government that they gave us weapons, because we got weapons from different sources. Actually, we didn’t need to get weapons from Turkey,” he explains, noting that the Free Syrian Army soldiers would trade their weapons for a pack of cigarettes. “Anti-government Syrian people provided us with weapons; many mafias and groups traded weapons to us.”

“In Syria the oil was enough to pay for the weapons and everything needed,” Abu Mansour continues. “[Our oil revenues] were more than $14 million per month and half of this oil money is more than enough to pay for everything needed for our weapons expenditures.” When I remark on the huge amount of $7 million per month for weapons, Abu Mansour states, “It’s actually a small amount. Turkey sometimes opened an operation in which the management for one battle is $10 million.” When pressed for more figures on the total ISIS budget, Abu Mansour says he’s been in captivity for 1.5 years and doesn’t remember the total ISIS budget anymore. Yet it sounds like he once knew it well and in detail.

Negotiating for Crossing the Turkish Borders

“We negotiated to send our fighters to the hospitals [in Turkey]. There was facilitation – they didn’t look at the passports of those coming for treatment. It was always an open gate. If we had an ambulance we could cross without question. We could cross [into Turkey] at many places. They don’t ask about official identities. We just have to let them know.”

When asked to explain exactly how this occurs, Abu Mansour explains, “When the person gets injured, there is hospital in Syria, and this hospital sends him in a car to the border. There were ambulances on the Turkish side waiting for this person. There were doctors who disliked Bashar. They treated our guys. The MIT was made aware of every critical situation and they sent the ambulances to the border. There were also hospitals close to the border. Those who received critical care were treated there and they [the MIT] sent the others all over Turkey depending on their needs. There were very interested doctors, Syrian and Turkish, who wanted to help. So, if there were not facilities to serve them on the border, they would be sent further into Turkey for this.”

We ask who paid the medical bills. “Dawlah [ISIS] paid for the treatments, but some Turkish public hospitals took these fighters for free. It was not only for our fighters but also for the victims of bombings. I don’t know how many were treated in Turkey, but it was routine,” Abu Mansour explains, adding that it was not his area, so he doesn’t have the figures on that. “I just know this agreement to open the gates for our wounded and that there were ambulances sent for them. It was a ‘state-to-state’ agreement regarding our wounded. I negotiated these agreements. For the wounded, medical and other supplies to pass, and I negotiated about water also, the Euphrates.”

Negotiating for Water

The water issue was crucial for ISIS, actually, allowing them to have water for farming and to generate electricity through dams. “Actually, we [Syria] had an agreement with Turkey for 400 cubic meters per second [of water] into Syria. After the revolution, they started to decrease the quantity of water to 150 cubic meters per second. After our negotiations [in 2014] it returned to 400. We needed it for electrical power and as a vital source of living. Even water we cannot keep it, it passes to Iraq also,” he explains. “But the importance of water [cannot be understated]. We don’t need to generate electricity through the dams. We could have another source [i.e. petrol], but we need water for farming. There are three dams. The biggest is Tabqa dam. Actually, at 150 cubic meters, we could generate some electricity, but if the level of the lake reached 5 meters it would not work.”

“It took a long time to negotiate,” Abu Mansour explains. When asked what ISIS gave in return for water, he answers, “There is the most important benefit – their country will be safe and stable.” We ask if he means that ISIS agreed not to attack inside Turkey.

“In negotiations I could not say I would attack Turkey. This is the language of gangs, but I would say we will try to keep Turkey from the field battle, we will not see Turkey as an enemy. They understood what we are talking about. We said many times, ‘You are not our enemy and not our friend.’”

Abu Mansour explains that ISIS dealt both with Turkey and Assad’s regime to manage the Tabqa dam as well as other resources under their control. “At the end when Raqqa was encircled, the coalition forces tried to control the rooms for the dam. There was no control. All the gates were closed and the level of water rose. Rumors were that it would burst, but this was not technically true.” To fix the issue ISIS sent for Assad’s engineers to try to manually open the gates. “About these engineers, this is a company that belongs to the Assad regime. When he tried to fix the gate and open it manually, he was hit by the coalition forces. He died in Raqqa.”

Oil Sales

Regarding the sale of ISIS oil, Abu Mansour admits, “Most of the Syrian oil was going to Turkey, and just small amounts went to the Bashar regime.” Abu Mansour claims he did not need to negotiate these sales directly with the Turkish government officials as “this happened spontaneously.”

“There are many traders to do that and Turkey was the only market in which to send oil. Their traders paid for the oil that went into Turkey,” he explains making clear that although Erdogan’s son is believed to have been enriched by ISIS oil, that the deals occurred via middle men. “Oil that went to the Syrian government – some went by pipes, some by trucks. Oil sent by Dawlah [ISIS] to Turkey was arranged by traders from Turkey who came to take the oil with our permissions. Traders came from the Syrian side also.”

Negotiating for the Release of Turkish Diplomats, Soldiers and Citizens

When asked about the negotiations for the release of the Turkish diplomats and workers after ISIS took Mosul, Abu Mansour explains, “The negotiation happened in Syria. Actually, [ISIS] entry in Mosul was not a surprise takeover in one day. It took many days, but I think the Turkish government told their consul not to leave Mosul. Many Turkish truck drivers were also in Mosul at that time. They were not in danger, but there was a negotiation to release them. Islamic State made demands as well. It took time.”

“We didn’t ask ransom for the consul employees, we asked for our prisoners. MIT knows their names.” For the consul employees, “approximately 500 prisoners were released from Turkey, and they came back to Dawlah,” Abu Mansour explains.

In regard to the soldiers guarding the tomb of Suleyman Shah that Turkish soldiers had permission to guard inside Syria, which was taken by ISIS in 2014, Abu Mansour states, “It wasn’t liberation of their soldiers. They had 45 guards that they changed every 6 months. They changed at the time of FSA [being defeated]. Turkey made it look like they got liberated [when ISIS took over] but it was really just the change of guards. [Likewise,] at that time we didn’t want to open problems with Turkey. It would have been an obstacle to our work, so we gave them back.”


Turkey’s Double Game with the West

According to Abu Mansour, in 2014 Turkey was trying to play a double game with the West: to allow foreign fighters into Syria but make it appear as though they were taking measures to prevent it. “Turkey wanted to make it easy for foreign fighters to cross the borders,” Abu Mansour explains. “They just want to control, they need to be known, and how they enter, so they ask me to tell who has entered and where. Actually, the Turkish side said, ‘You should reduce, change the way you do it, the way you cross. For example, don’t come with a group to enter because it’s clear that a bunch of people entered. Enter only specific gates. Come without any weapons. Don’t come with long beards. Your entry from north to south should be hidden as much as possible.’”

“For example, the EU guys were very distinguished with their beards so they should come at night and cross, and they should not come in groups as before, to hide it. For Europeans, it depends on the person. If he can mix with Syrians he can come without being noticed – the Arabs, they can enter normally.” We didn’t ask Abu Mansour if the European Arabs were given fake Syrian passports to enter, but we did learn from other ISIS members we have interviewed that fake Syrian passports were provided by ISIS operatives to Europeans and others while still in Istanbul. Likely, these are the persons Abu Mansour is saying could enter normally through the border gates as they could easily pass for legitimate entries from Syria into Turkey by appearance and documentation.

“[In 2014,] they opened some legal gates under the eye of Turkish intel that our people went in and out through,” Abu Mansour explains. “But, entry into Syria was easier than return to Turkey. Turkey controlled the movements.”

For those who could not pass as Syrians legally crossing into Syria, Abu Mansour explains that they used “specific ways provided by smugglers” and that “of course Dawlah pays them.” He also notes that when smugglers worked for years, “of course they are recruited to [Turkish] security services, too.” Yet these persons were never completely trusted by ISIS as they were in it for the money only. “The smuggler is like a trader, a guy with a taxi – you pay him, but you don’t trust him. He isn’t necessarily loyal, [he has] maybe some sympathy to the Syrian side.”

An ISIS Ambassador in Ankara

“Our negotiations took place one time in Syria, second time in Turkey and so on, [back and forth],” Abu Mansour explains, and most often “near the borders, close to the official gates.” However, in 2016, Abu Mansour was asked to present himself in Ankara and stay for a few weeks. “They asked us to stay for a while in Turkey, perhaps to meet with President Erdogan. At this time in 2016, before the military assault on Manbij between June to September 2016 (May to August 2016), Turkey was trying to withdraw from the Islamic State. I went to stay in Ankara.”

Suddenly terrified at the idea that we could have been at the same hotel in Ankara during one of my many visits there, I ask him with horror filling my voice where he stayed. “There was a private guest hotel, an intelligence guest house. I think I was in the specific place of their headquarters office, or maybe it’s a crisis cell. I stayed one week.” Still fixated on the chance that I could have unknowingly crossed paths with an ISIS emissary in Turkey, I ask if he went out on the town during the days or at night. “They do not refuse if I ask to go out. I was under their protection. They also suggested if I want to take one week for rest here that I could.” Indeed, we could have crossed paths…

Negotiating a Buffer Zone

“There were ups and downs with Turkey,” Abu Mansour states. Likewise, there were factions inside ISIS that didn’t agree with one another. “After the Manbij events there were many changes and there was always internal conflict in the Islamic State. Turkey asked us many times for a separate area between Turkey and Syria for a safe zone. They wanted 10 km for Syrians to live but under control of Turkey.”

It’s interesting to note that even ISIS was considered a danger to the Turks, as they now claim the Syrian Kurds are. “Turkey wanted us to move 10 km back from the borders so the danger from Turkey is removed. They wanted it to be under control of Turkey and no aviation above it. This was for an area 60 km long and 10 km wide.”

ISIS Attacks in Turkey

We ask him how things went wrong with Turkey – that ISIS began attacking at the airport and at the Reina nightclub and on the streets in Ankara and Istanbul. “The operation of bombing in Turkey was not political. I was in Turkey and they thought I have a link with these things. I was in Gaziantep when the [Istanbul] airport was attacked,” he replied. “When those things happened, they thought it was something prepared from the political side of the Islamic State, but that’s not logical. We are there and attacking them?”

“It was directed from Raqqa,” Abu Mansour explains. “The ISIS external emni ordered it. And I think that there were Turkish MIT guys inside the external emni. I suspected that the striking at the airport was not for the benefit of IS, but Turkish groups of IS who wanted to strike Turkey, or they were affected by other agencies that don’t want a relationship between Dawlah and Turkey. It makes no sense, otherwise, because most of our people came through that airport. These orders for these attacks in Turkey were from those MIT guys inside Dawlah but not from our political side. They didn’t want to destroy Erdogan, just change his road in the matter of the Syrian issue. They wanted him to use his army to attack Syria, and to attack Dawlah. The airport attack makes a good excuse for him to come into Syria.”

“It’s not a conspiracy theory,” Abu Mansour insists, telling us that when he was imprisoned in YPG prisons, before being moved to Iraq, he heard “that the Turkish government, after they were in Raqqa, took 40 persons out that were part of Turkish security agencies.”

While what he heard could be true, it doesn’t mean that these Turkish intel actors were working with ISIS. They may have been Turkish intel planted inside the organization to keep tabs on it. Yet, Abu Mansour insists that Turkey, and President Erdogan with his “Islamists’ aspirations” was working hand in glove with ISIS and reminds us, “If you go back to Erdogan’s history, in 83 to 87, he was a fighter in Afghanistan. This stuck with him.”

Dashed Dreams of an Islamic State

Abu Mansour’s journey started in Morocco when he was a young man and where he first watched the 9/11 events from afar and suddenly began to feel that if he wasn’t with them, as U.S. President Bush stated, he was against them – that Muslims in the world needed to unite and resist dictators and world powers, like the U.S.-led coalition that invaded foreign countries. “After I heard George Bush say it’s you are with us or against us – when I heard that [and saw his invasion of Iraq] I searched for who stands up for the Muslims.”

Abu Mansour began following the actions of leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and learning militant jihadi teachings over the Internet. “The invasion of Iraq affected deeply in the heart of Muslims more than Afghanistan,” he explains. “We start to build ourselves at that time. We know that we are fighting very smart people and we have to prepare very well. Those groups who chose the resistance [in Morocco] would start and then they were captured, which made me to be very alert, and very patient to chose when to resist.”

Abu Mansour waited until 2013, when he became convinced that the time was right and an Islamic State could be created in Syria, at which time he was already fully committed to come and help bring it to fruition. “We were searching for the identity of Muslims, to protect Muslims and to be freed to do our Islamic duties. There was no desire to fight, no tendency to kill or revenge, just to free ourselves from dictators. I use the weapon to prevent harm by others and all that is taken by force should be regained by force,” he explains. “All these government regimes, we were forced to follow, we didn’t chose them.” Indeed.

Now imprisoned, he has had time to reflect on whether or not the dream of a just and good Islamic State is even possible and if ISIS had any chance of bringing it to reality.

“Today I feel really tired,” he confesses. “It’s not like you see it. Most were not educated people in IS. Most have some reasons for joining, how they collect them to make this state, who collects them, the matter is really strange,” he reflects, sadness filling his eyes. “While we came to save Muslims from the authoritarian control of the Syrian regime and to build these things [the ISIS dream,] we were shocked and we fell into the same that they were in. There are many people in authority in the Islamic State that are dictatorial. Sometimes I feel like we were used like a paper burned and discarded. We tried to remove Assad and replaced with worse than Assad.”

“The practices used against the Syrian people, it was very violent. The people under the authority of IS, they don’t care about the education system. They just wanted to extract the oil, etc. They didn’t give thought to the poor people, to enhance their life levels, to be taken care of. Likewise, under Bashar, the Ba’ath Party regime has a very violent security agency, but ISIS built worse than this – the emni security system. Also, they divided the people into fighter and non-fighters, and the fighters were not punished like they punished the others,” he said.

“In Raqqa there were bodies on the roads in different places, actually when you pass through the squares and roads you see hanging bodies. There were hangings, torture with electricity… They are not good people. They try to take benefit from their places. Each one has a desire to control.”

“My search was not for power, or getting authority or ruling,” Abu Mansour claims, and he may be speaking honestly. Once representing ISIS as an ambassador, representing a short-lived, but powerful state, he is now powerless, sitting in an Iraqi prison, facing a death sentence – his dreams dashed completely.

Special thanks to the Iraq Counter Terrorism Services, ICSVE’s partner in Iraq, supporting ICSVE’s research on behalf of our Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project.

Homeland Security Today

Syrians celebrating new year at Istanbul’s Taksim square sparks outrage

Thousands of Syrian refugees in Turkey pouring into Istanbul’s Taksim square on Monday night to celebrate the new year created a wave of anti-Syrian outrage in the country, Sözcü newspaper reported.

Turks reacted when many young Syrian men opened flags and chanted slogans in square, the central point of new year celebrations in Turkey.

A video showing Syrian refugees’ new year celebrations in Istanbul went viral in the early hours of 2019, with many lashing out at the Syrians and the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Syrian refugees policy on social media.

Over 5,000 tweets were posted within hours with the hashtag #ÜlkemdeSuriyeliİstemiyorum [I don’t want Syrians in my country].

“In the video, which was shared by thousands in a couple of hours, there are Syrians who are jubilantly celebrating the new year by dancing in the Taksim square and waving Syrian flags. But, it is noticed that there are no Turks among those joining the celebrations,” Sözcü newspaper said.

One Syrian man was detained by the police on Monday night for allegedly sexually harassing two women, Sözcü said.

Turkey is home to a reported 3.8 million Syrian refugees, having implemented an open doors policy since the beginning of the conflict in the neighbouring country in 2011.

More than 70 percent of Turkish people believe Syrian refugees are taking their jobs and two-thirds think Syrians are responsible for increasing the crime rate, according to a poll conducted by Istanbul Bilgi University’s Centre for Migration Research in 2018.

“In the past we were talking about tourists being harassed during celebrations in Taksim, now we are excepted to digest the fact that Syrians wave their flags and harass us. Welcome 2019, this is Turkey,” Ata Benli, a Turkish Twitter user said. ( VIDEO )

Some Turks spoke out against the outrage and hashtag against Syrians.

‚‘It’s easy to say I don‘t want Syrians in my country just because they had fun in Taksim Square. If we are to question anything, it should be the support Turkey provides to armed forces under the name of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). For example, the fee for the salary, clothing, weapons and food provided to this group is coming out of the pockets of this country’s citiziens,'‘ one Twitter user said.

https://de.share-your-photo.com/img/0130d665b4.jpg

“Did our young people become martyred on their soil for Syrian youth to invade Taksim, to stage a show with their flags chanting ‘Syria’, and to harass our girls,” another one said on Twitter.

https://de.share-your-photo.com/img/8018cabb06.jpg

‚‘You don‘t want Syrians in your country, but do the Syrians want you in their country?'‘ another user asked, in an apparent reference to Turkey’s military presence in the country.

https://de.share-your-photo.com/img/86329f0d81.jpg

“There are Syrians everywhere, on the streets at schools, offices,” one Turkish woman said. “Taksim has been invaded by them. They can mark this in history as ‘land invaded without fighting any war’,” she added.

Özkan Yalım, a deputy of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), also criticised the Syrians’ celebrations. “On the one side there are our glorious Turkish soldiers during in Syria, on the other side there are Syrians celebrating new year in Istanbul. Isn’t enough is enough,” he said.

https://de.share-your-photo.com/img/3052520f61.jpg

Many Turks are angered by AKP policies which they claim provide Syrian refugees with preferential treatment in social services as well as financial assistance.

The debate over Turkey’s protection of Syrian refugees has taken on more urgency in the past year, with opposition lawmakers criticising the government’s spending on refugees during an economic downturn.

Some 55,000 Syrians have been granted Turkish citizenship in the past seven years, according to the Turkish government.


Ahval

Kurde in der Westtürkei erschossen

https://de.share-your-photo.com/img/b2d7102a7a.jpg

In Sakarya in der Westtürkei ist ein Kurde erschossen worden, weil er auf die Frage, ob er Kurde ist, mit „ja“ geantwortet hat. Vor zwei Jahren wurde bereits sein Bruder auf gleiche Weise ermordet.

Weil sie kurdisch miteinander gesprochen haben, sind Kadir Sakçı (43) und sein 16-jähriger Sohn Burhan in der westtürkischen Provinz Sakarya mit einer Schusswaffe angegriffen worden. Der Vater erlag seinen Schussverletzungen, der Sohn wurde schwer verletzt. Der Angreifer erklärte zu seiner Verteidigung, er sei betrunken gewesen und könne sich an nichts erinnern.

Der Vorfall ereignete sich bereits am vergangenen Sonntag in der Kreisstadt Hendek vor einer Kneipe. Nach vorliegenden Informationen hat der aus Mûş stammende Kadir Sakçı seinen Sohn vom Friseur abgeholt. Als sie an einer Kneipe vorbeigingen, wurde ihnen der Weg von Hikmet Usta (55) und weiteren Männern abgeschnitten. Vater und Sohn hatten sich zuvor in ihrer Muttersprache Kurdisch unterhalten. Usta fragte nach: „Seid ihr Kurden oder aus Syrien?“ Kadir Sakçı antwortete: „Ja, wir sind Kurden.“ Daraufhin zog Usta eine Waffe und schoss. Vater und Sohn wurden verletzt ins Krankenhaus eingeliefert, wo Kadir Sakçı seinen Verletzungen erlag. Burhan wird weiterhin im Krankenhaus behandelt.

Der Täter Hikmet Usta flüchtete nach Bursa, wo er festgenommen wurde. Nach Angaben von Fahrettin Sakçı, eines Bruders des Getöteten, ist im Jahr 2016 bereits ein weiterer Bruder, Sabri Sakçı, auf gleiche Weise auf der Straße erschossen worden. Von vier Tätern wurde nur einer verurteilt, der vorzeitig aus der Haft entlassen wurde.

ANF




kostenloser Counter
Poker Blog